Most decision problems can be understood as a mapping from a preference space into a set of outcomes. When preferences are representable via utility functions, this generates a mapping from a space of utility functions into outcomes. We say a model is continuous in utilities (resp., preferences) if small perturbations of utility functions (resp., preferences) generate small changes in outcomes. While similar, these two concepts are equivalent only when the topology satisfies the following universal property: for each continuous mapping from preferences to outcomes there is a unique mapping from utilities to outcomes that is faithful to the preference map and is continuous. The topologies that satisfy such a universal property are called final topologies. In this paper we analyze the properties of the final topology for preference sets. This is of practical importance since most of the analysis on continuity is done via utility functions and not the primitive preference space. Our results allow the researcher to extrapolate continuity in utility to continuity in the underlying preferences.
Introduction
Consider the following results about a decision maker with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences. As the elasticity of substitution approaches zero, the CES function approaches a Leontief utility function. Likewise, as the elasticity of substitution approaches unity, the CES utility function approaches a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Formally, the CES function is given by
where σ is the elasticity of substitution and px 1 , x 2 q P R 2 . Then, we have the following limits:
, as ρ Ñ 0.
It is natural to interpret these results in the following manner. As the elasticity of substitution converges to unity, the decision maker's preferences approach the preferences of a Cobb-Douglas decision maker. Thus, any result that is true for a Cobb-Douglas decision maker should be approximately true for a CES decision maker with σ « 1. For instance, a Cobb-Douglas consumer spends a constant fraction of his total expenditure on good 1 and spends the rest on good 2; thus, one expects a CES decision maker with σ « 1 to approximately satisfy the same property. Similarly, a Leontief consumer consumes a bundle that is insensitive to Leontief-compensated price changes; we therefore expect a CES consumer with σ « 0 to approximately satisfy the same property.
For such an interpretation to be valid, two conditions about the topology with which we endow the preference space must be satisfied. First, the representation mapping-that is, the mapping that associates each utility function with the preference it represents-must be continuous. Hence, when two utility functions are close, so are the preferences they represent. Second, the topology on the prefer-ence space must preserve the continuous mappings to the space of the demand functions; indeed, we must guarantee that if the mapping from utilities to demand functions is continuous, then so is the mapping from preferences to demand functions. Moreover, if we want to claim that any result that is true about Cobb-Douglas decision makers will be approximately true for a CES decision maker with σ « 1, then we need to preserve all continuous mappings from the utility space to any outcome space, not only the space of the demand functions.
In this paper, we characterize the topology on preference spaces that is defined by the two properties above; such a topology is called the final topology on preferences. The final topology on preferences can be represented by the diagram in Figure 1 . Consider any outcome space of interest-for example, the space of Marshall/Hicks demand functions, indirect utility/expenditure functions, best response strategies in a game, etc.-and function g from preferences to the outcome space of interest. The final topology satisfies that g is continuous if and only if there exists a unique continuous function, h, such that the diagram commutes;
that is, hpuq " pg˝F qpuq for all utility functions u. What this guarantees is that the preference space preserves the structure of continuous mappings from utility functions to the economic space of interest (demand functions, indirect utility functions, best responses in games, etc.). Specifically, setting the outcome space equal to the preference space and setting function g equal to the identity function, we find that the representation mapping, F , must be continuous.
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Outcome Space Representation Mapping, F h g Figure 1 : The final topology on the preference space makes the diagram commute and preserves all continuous mappings.
In this framework, we provide three theorems that relate substantive economic assumptions a researcher can impose on preference spaces to the topological properties of the preference space.
Theorem 1 shows that when no restrictions are imposed on the preference space, this topology is the trivial topology: the only open sets are the empty set and the full space. The driving force behind this results is that total indifference, i.e., the preference where no alternative is strictly preferred to another, is part of the preference space. Since total indifference is a preference that generates uninteresting economic predictions, it is customary to exclude it from the set of admissible preferences; in our case, this rules out the trivial topology as a characterization of the final topology.
Theorem 2 shows that if we focus on all preferences except total indifference, then the final topology is not trivial, it is path-connected, but it is not Hausdorff. By path-connected, we mean that given any two preferences, either one can be continuously distorted into the other; by Hausdorff, we mean that for any two distinct preferences, there is a neighborhood of the first and a neighborhood of the second such that these two neighborhoods are disjoint. While path-connectedness is an appealing property, failing the Hausdorff property is an unappealing property of the final topology (see Subsections 1.1 and 1.2 for discussions on the economic implications of these properties). What prevents the space from being Hausdorff is the presence of non-singleton indifference curves. Theorem 3 characterizes the final topology for the space of strict preferences, that is, preferences where no two points are indifferent. We show that the space of strict preferences is a Hausdorff space that is totally path-disconnected. Moreover, proposition 1 shows that the set of strict preferences is the largest set that is both Hausdorff and includes all strict preferences. This result indicates that path-connectedness and the Hausdorff property are mutually exclusive properties for preferences spaces, and they hold (or fail) depending on whether we allow indifferences. Therefore, assumptions on indifference curves have topological meaning.
As such, the topological properties of preference spaces are not a mere technicality but carry substantial economic meaning and methodological restrictions. Importantly, throughout this paper, we do not impose any topology on the space of alternatives. Sections 2 and 5 discuss why it might be desirable to conduct this exercise without assuming a specific topology on the space of alternatives. However, as discussed in Section 2, all the work performed on topologies for preference spaces impose topological assumptions on the space of alternatives. Hence, Section 5 characterizes the final topology on preferences when we impose topological assumptions on the space of alternatives. Comparing the final topology on preferences when we do and do not impose a topology on alternatives highlights the role that topological assumptions on the preference space play in shaping the topology of preferences.
In short, the paper has two main takeaways. First, there is a nontrivial trade-off between methodological generality and intuitive properties of the preference space. Allowing for indifference in the space of preferences is natural but leads to a preference space that is not Hausdorff. However, recovering the Hausdorff property comes at the cost of restricting attention to strict preferences only and losing pathconnectedness. Thus, there is a fundamental trade-off between methodological generality, the intuitive properties of the topology on preferences, and the structure of indifference curves. Second, by comparing the topology on preferences both when we do and do not impose topological assumptions on the alternative space sheds light on how the topologies on alternatives impact the topologies on preferences. A discussion of why one might, or might not, want to impose a topology on the preference space is delayed until Sections 2 and 5.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 discuss why the Hausdorff property and path connectedness are appealing properties for a preference space. Section 2 discusses our exercise in the context of the related literature. Section 3 presents the model, and Section 4 shows our main results. Section 5 extends the model to allow for topologies on the set of alternatives.
On the importance of the Hausdorff property
Failure of the Hausdorff property means that a constant sequence of decisions admits a limit point that is different from the constant decision itself. This is an unnatural property that we wish our model to avoid: in general, if we observe a sequence of constant decisions and we ask ourselves what is the limiting decision, it should only be the constant decision itself.
To illustrate the importance of the Hausdorff property, suppose that we line up a sequence of consumers deciding their demand functions, all of whom have the same preferences, ą. Then, all these consumers have the same demand function, D. For instance, all consumers could be Cobb-Douglas and D " p αp 1 w x 1 , p1´αqp 2 w x 2 q, where w is wealth and pp 1 , p 2 q is the price vector.
If the Hausdorff property fails, then the sequence pą, ą, ą, ...q has someą as a limit point, whereą is different from ą. Furthermore,ą has as a demand functionD that is different from D. As a consequence, the sequence of demand functions pD, D, D, ...q hasD as a limit point, thus violating the intuitive rule that a sequence of constant decisions should converge only to the decision itself.
On the importance of path-connectedness.
A model's continuity in utilities (or preference) is intimately tied to a comparative statics question: if a decision maker's preference was to change slightly, would his decisions change drastically? However, in order to ask this question, slight changes to a decision maker's preference must exist. A corollary of Theorem 3 is that the space of strict preferences is totally path-disconnected. Hence, each singleton is an open set, so no such thing as a "slight" change to a consumer's preference is possible.
Another way to see this result is to consider the following related question.
Assume we consider two distinct preferences, ą A and ą B , and suppose that under preference ą A the model outputs prediction zpą A q, whereas under preference ą B , the model outputs prediction zpą B q. If we continuously change preference ą A into preference ą B , is it true that the model's outcome continuously changes from zpą A q to zpą B q? This is the basis for homotopy-based comparative statics exercises (see Shiomura [9] , Borkovsky [2] , or Eaves and Schmedders [6] for applications). However, in order to conduct this exercise, we need the space of preferences to be path-connected. Hence, losing path-connectedness implies losing access to local comparative statics tools in the space of preferences.
Relation to existing literature
To the best of our knowledge, all work conducted on topologies for preference spaces comes from the literature on general equilibrium. Debreu [4] proposes a topology on the space of continuous preferences that is based on the Hausdorff semimetric; Hildebrand [7] provides generalizations on Debreu's work. In these works, the space of alternatives, X, is endowed with an exogenous topology such that any continuous preference ą can be identified with a closed subset of XˆX.
In Debreu's work, X is assumed to be compact, so ą is a closed compact subset of XˆX. By contrast, Hildebrand assumes X to be locally compact, so ą is compact in the one-point Alexandroff compactification of X. The objective of these assumptions is to associate each preference with a closed subset of a compact space; therefore, one obtains a separable space by endowing the preference space with the Hausdorff semimetric. Because the space of preferences is given the topology of the Hausdorff semimetric, Hildebrand calls it the topology of closed convergence. Lastly, Kannai [8] takes the work of Debreu and analyzes the special case when preferences are continuous and monotone.
Outside the realm of general equilibrium, Chambers, Echenique and Lambert [3] use tools from the above literature to address the following question. Suppose one observes a finite but large dataset generated by picking maximal elements out of a preference ą. Can one find a preferenceą such thatą rationalizes observed choices andą is "close" to the true preference ą? They provide a positive answer under the topology of closed convergence when preferences are assumed to be locally strict (see Border and Segal [1] or Section 5 for a definition of locally strict preference).
Our exercise differs from the previous exercises in three ways.
First, we wish to find a topology for preference spaces that is independent of any exogenously imposed topology on X. Note that the study of topology is the study of continuous mappings; thus, choosing a topology for a set is equivalent to choosing a structure for continuous mappings involving the set. For decision problems, the minimal requirement should be that optimal binary decisions are continuous; that is, if x is strictly preferred to y and one perturbs y slightly, then x should remain preferred. The smallest topology with this property is the topology generated by the upper and lower contour sets of the preference under study. Therefore, any topology on X that makes optimal behavior continuous will inherently depend on the preference under consideration: the topology on R 2 that guarantees continuity of behavior for a lexicographic agent is fundamentally different from the topology on R 2 that guarantees continuous behavior for a Cobb-Douglas agent. Insisting on a preference-independent topology on X and excluding any preference that generates noncontinuous behavior with respect to such an arbitrarily chosen topology is unnatural in the context of decision making. Section 5 argues that our approach of remaining agnostic about the topology on X is equivalent to endowing X with the topology generated by the upper and lower contour sets and allowing the topology on X to vary as preferences vary. In short, assuming X is not exogenously endowed with a topology is equivalent to assuming that all preferences are inherently continuous; some are just discontinuous relative to additional assumptions on X.
Second, because we do not impose a topology on X, continuity imposes no discipline in our model. Comparing our topology to the topology of closed convergence highlights how the exogenous topology on X (together with the continuity restriction on preferences) shapes the topology on preference spaces. For example, the metrization aspect of preference is purely driven by the topological assumptions on X since preference spaces are generally not Hausdorff in the absence of an exogenous topology for X. As previously discussed, this means that the topological properties of preference spaces are driven by considerations that are not based on the economic decisions being taken.
Finally, the topology of closed convergence is motivated by attempting to adapt the Hausdorff semimetric for closed sets to the preference space; that demand functions are upper hemicontinuous in preferences is proved as a theorem. Our approach is slightly different. In our motivation, that the optimizing behavior is continuous in preferences is part of the definition of our topology, not a result: we want to guarantee that an economic model is continuous in preference if and only if it is continuous in utilities, regardless of whether the Hausdorff semimetric achieves this objective. Furthermore, preserving the structure of continuous mappings from utilities to behavior includes, but need not be restricted to, maximizing behavior. For instance, if one was to write a behavioral model where agents do not fully optimize (for example, the satisficing model in the spirit of Simon [10] ) and the model is continuous in utility functions, then our topology demands that it should also be continuous in preferences. This result validates the methodology of looking at utility functions as a shortcut for analyzing continuity in preferences universally across applications, not just demand functions.
Model
Let X be a relevant choice space, U be the set of all utility functions on X, and P be the set of all binary relations on X that admit a utility representation. That is, for each ąP P, there exists a function u P U such that for all x, y P X, x ą y if and only if upxq ą upyq. While most preference representation theorems hinge on X being a separable topological space, Echenique and Dubra [5] characterize the conditions under which a preference admits a utility representation in the absence of topological assumptions on X. Let F : U Ñ P denote the mapping that takes each utility function to the preference it represents; that is, for all x, y P X, upxq ą upyq if and only if xF puqy. We call mapping F the representation mapping. Finally, let T U denote the pointwise topology on U. 1 Our goal is to find a topology on P that preserves the structure of continuous mappings from U to any abstract set Z. If such a topology exists, then the continuous mappings from P to Z should be in one-to-one correspondence with the continuous mappings from U to Z. This requirement is captured by the definition below. Graphically, the final topology on P is the topology on P that makes the diagram in Figure 2 commute and preserves the structure of continuous mappings from util-ities to any economic variable of interest, Z. The uniqueness condition guarantees that there is a bijection between the continuous functions g and the continuous functions h; thus, our topology endows the preference space with exactly the same continuous functions as admitted by the utility space. 
Results
In this section, we present our three theorems. We briefly describe the theorems and follow up with formal statements. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
All preferences
Theorem 1 shows that without any restrictions on P, topology T P must be trivial. That is, the only open sets are the empty set and P itself. The driving force behind this result is that total indifference, that is, the preference such that any two alternatives are indifferent, is an element of P. To see this result intuitively, consider any preference ąP P and any utility function that represents it, u P U. We can always flatten u into the constant function 0 in a way that is both continuous and preserves the underlying preference ą; that is, we can find a sequence pu n q nPN such that each u n represents ą and u n Ñ 0. Since the representation mapping is continuous, the total indifference (which we denote as ») belongs to the closure of tąu. Therefore, the closure of any singleton contains the same element, ». The only way this is possible is if the topology is trivial: total indifference is the glue that binds the whole space together into essentially a single point.
Theorem 1. Let T P denote the final topology on P. Then, T P " tH, Pu.
Since total indifference is a nongeneric preference, it is natural to ask how Theorem 1 changes when we exclude this preference from P.
All preferences except total indifference
To formally present Theorem 2, we first provide some important notation. First, let P˚" Pzt»u, where » is the total indifference preferences, i.e., »" XˆX.
By analogy, let U˚" tu P U : u is not constantu be endowed with the subspace topology; that is,
In what follows, let T P˚d enote the final topology on P˚relative to U˚.
Moreover, let A Ă X be any finite set and ąP P˚be such that for all x, y P A either
x ą y or y ą x, i.e., x  y. Then, let Bpą, Aq " tą : p@x, y P Aq x ą y ô xąyu.
The set Bpą, Aq consists of all preferences that agree with ą on the finite set A of strictly ranked alternatives.
Once we exclude total indifference from the set of preferences, Lemma 3 and Theorem 2 characterize a basis for T P . Indeed, each set Bpą, Aq is a basis element; thus, spanning all combinations pą, Aq generates a basis for T P˚. However, this topology is not Hausdorff. Furthermore, Proposition 1 shows that unless we consider only strict preferences, that is, preferences where no two alternatives are indifferent, T P can never be Hausdorff. Since, as argued in Section 1, the Hausdorff property is an intuitive property to ask for, we further restrict attention to strict preferences.
Lemma 3 proves that F is an open map independent of the topology imposed for U. As such, one can characterize the basis elements of P˚by pushing forward the basis elements of U˚. Thus, we obtain a clear characterization for P˚.
Two corollaries follow from Theorem 2. First, if X has at least three elements, then TP is not Hausdorff. To illustrate this result, take any triplet of points x, y, z P X and consider a preference ąP U˚such that x ą y ą w. Consider any u P F´1pąq and construct the following transformations:
Note that F pu n q "ą for each n and that F plimtu n uq "ą ‰ą. By the continuity of F , this meansą P tąu, where tąu denotes the closure of the singleton tąu.
Hence, singletons are not sequentially closed, implying P˚is not Hausdorff.
Second, provided that X has at least three elements, P˚is connected. This result is easily demonstrated by contradiction. Suppose G 1 and G 2 disconnect P˚. Then, for some collections pą i , tx i , y i uq iPI and pą j , tx j , y j uq jPJ , we have G 1 " Y i Bpą i , tx i , y i uq and G 2 Y j Bpą j , tx j , y j uq; without loss of generality, assume that
x i ą i y i and x j ą j y j for all i P I and j P J. Assume that there exist i P I and j P J such that tx i , y i u ‰ tx j , y j u. Construct ą as follows: for all z R tx i , y i x j , y j u, x i ą y i , x j ą y j , and z " y j . Then, ąP G 1 X G 2 , a contradiction. Hence, G 1 " Bpą 1 , tx, yuq for some pą 1 , tx, yuq and G 2 " Bpą 2 , tx, yuq for some ą 2 such that ą 1 |tx, yu ‰ą 2 |tx, yu. Considerą defined as follows: for all z, z 1 ‰ x, y; z 1" ząx " y. Then,ą R G 1 Y G 2 , a contradiction. Thus, there cannot be sets G 1 and G 2 that disconnect P˚.
Lemma 7 shows a stronger result: U˚is path-connected when X has at least three elements. Since P˚" F pU˚q and F is continuous, P˚is path-connected. As discussed in Section 1, this is an important property of the preference space.
Strict preferences only
Theorem 3 shows that in the subspace of strict preferences, the topology identified in Theorem 2 is Hausdorff but totally path-disconnected. Thus, Theorem 3 presents a fundamental trade-off. While it is natural to consider nonstrict preferences, this implies that any topology that universally preserves continuous mappings cannot be Hausdorff; conversely, while the Hausdorff property is a natural property to ask of a topology, it comes at the cost of considering only strict prefer-ence spaces. A consequence of these observations is that topological conditions on preference spaces carry substantive behavioral assumptions about the indifference structures allowed in the preference space.
As before, to formally present Theorem 3, we provide some useful notation. Formally, let P s " tąP P : p@x, y P Xq x  yu and U s " tu P U : p@x, y P Xq upxq ‰ upyqu. Analogously, we let T P s denote the final topology on P s relative to U s . Interestingly, the basis for T P s is the same as that for T P˚; however, by excluding indifferences from the set of possible preferences, we can show that P s is Hausdorff, but we lose connectedness. To see that P s is Hausdorff, consider any preference ąP P s and let ą´1 be the opposite preference. That is, for all x, y P X, x ą y ô y ą´1 x. Note that ą´1P P˚; therefore, this preference is well defined. Then, P˚ztąu " Y x,yPX Bpą´1, tx, yuq: indeed, ifą P P˚ztąu, it must disagree with ą on some pair tx, yu and, thus, must agree with ą´1 on pair tx, yu. Since each Bpą´1, tx, yuq is open, the complement of tąu relative to P s is open, showing that the singletons are closed. However, P s fails to be path-connected. This is in contrast to P˚, which fails to be Hausdorff but is path-connected. To see why P s is not connected, consider any preference ą and any pair x, y P X. Then, we can write X " Bpą, tx, yuqYBpą´1 , tx, yuq. Thus, we can express X as a disjoint union of two proper open sets, showing that X is disconnected. Lemma 8 provides a stronger result: P s is totally path-disconnected. An easy way to see this is to assume that X is finite: as mentioned in the previous section, when X is finite, P s is a discreet space in the sense that the singletons are open. Therefore, P s is totally path-disconnected. Section 4 presents results that do not presume any topology on the space of outcomes, Z, nor on the space of alternatives, X, because we are interested in providing a universal methodology under which continuity in utilities is equivalent to continuity in preferences. Theorems 1 and 2 suggest that any such topology fails to be Hausdorff at this level of generality. This result motivates Theorem 3 and the study of P s . However, one may ask if imposing topological assumptions on X might yield a topology on P or P˚that is Hausdorff, thus eliminating the need to restrict attention to P s .
There are two routes to consider for imposing a topology on X. First, one can assume X comes endowed with an exogenously given topology; for example, if X " R 2 , one may endow X with the topology induced by the Euclidean distance. Then, to guarantee that utility representations exist, one restricts attention to preferences that are continuous with respect to the given topology on X, that is, preferences such that the upper and lower contour sets are open sets in the topology of X. Alternatively, one may assume X does not have an exogenously given topology and, instead, impose that for each ąP P, the topology on X is the topology generated by the upper and lower contour sets. This approach generates a family of topological spaces, pX, T X pąqq ąPP , where T X pąq is the topology on X generated by the upper and lower contour sets.
In what follows, we analyze the final topology on P˚when we do and do not endow X with an exogenous topology.
Endowing X with an exogenous topology, T X
Since none of our results relied on a topology for X, the final topology on X is still the one defined in Theorem 2, and the space is still totally connected but not Hausdorff. However, assuming that X is endowed with an exogenous topology T X restores the Hausdorff property for a strict superset of P s . Indeed, in line with Border and Segal [1] , we say a preference, ą, is locally strict if, for every pair px, yq P X such that x " y we can find a pair that is arbitrarily close to px, yq, where the ranking is strict. Formally, we have Definition 3 below. Definition 2. Let pX, T X q be a topological space, and let P be the set of all preferences defined on X that admit a utility representation. We say ąP P is locally strict if the following holds: for each px, yq P XˆX such that x Á y and for every neighborhood V of px, yq, there exists px 1 , y 1 q P V such that x 1 ą y 1 .
Remark 1. Note that the definition of locally strict preference is effective only when x " y. Otherwise, x 1 " x and y 1 " y always satisfy the definition. Furthermore, since » is clearly not locally strict, the set of locally strict preferences is a subset of P˚.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, one should further restrict attention to continuous preferences; that is, preferences whose upper and lower contour sets are open in T X . This ensures that utility representations exist. For concreteness, we define continuity below. Definition 3. Let pX, T X q be a topological space, and let ą be a preference on X. We say ą is continuous if for all y P X the following are true:
We denote the set of continuous and locally strict preferences as P cls Theorem 4 shows that the space of continuous and locally strict preferences is indeed Hausdorff. Proposition 1 showcases the connection between the topological properties of preference spaces and the economic assumptions we make about indifference: concretely, the Hausdorff property is incompatible with nonstrict preferences. Theorem 4 reinterprets that result: Theorem 4 showcases the connections between the topological properties of the alternatives space, the topological properties of preference spaces, and the economic assumptions we make about indifference. As before, the Hausdorff property holds for a preference space as long as the preference is strict, but only in a local sense. Clearly, the exact meaning of "local" is given by the topology the researcher imposes on X: preferences that are locally strict in one topology might not be locally strict in another topology. One may worry that the topological properties of P˚might depend excessively on the arbitrary topology imposed on X, which motivates the results in the next section. 
5.2
Endowing X with the topology T X pąq for each ąP PC ontrary to the results in the previous subsection, one may not want to impose an exogenous topology on X. In contrast to the topology generated by lower and upper contour sets, exogenous topologies on X have no economic meaning because they are unrelated to any economic decision. However, if we consider the topology on X induced by the upper and lower contour sets, then this topology is intimately tied to the decision maker's economic decisions. Indeed, if ą is a preference and T X pąq is the topology generated by ą, this topology has a clear economic interpretation: a sequence of alternatives px n q nPN approximates an alternative x if any time x is worse than some z but better than some z 1 . Then, eventually x n is also worse than z and better than z 1 . Formally, for all alternatives z, z 1 such that z ą x ą z 1 , the sequence px n q nPN eventually satisfies z ą x n ą z 1 . Topologies T X that are independent of preferences have no such economic interpretation; in contrast, topology T X pąq has economic meaning since it depends only on how the decision maker perceives the alternatives, and it makes optimal behavior continuous. For example, a consumer choosing a bundle in R 2 who perceives the goods as perfect substitutes has discontinuous demand selections if we impose the Euclidean topology on R 2 ; however, the discontinuity disappears if we endow X with the topology generated by upper and lower contour sets.
To expand upon the above discussion, consider the following two examples. First, a consumer has to choose amongst bundles of two goods, so X " R 2 . This consumer has a satiation point such that consuming more than 10 units of either good produces no additional wellbeing. If we endow R 2 with the Euclidean distance, then x " px 1 , x 2 q " p10, 10q and y " py 1 , y 2 q " p1000, 1000q are "far away". However, from the decision maker's perspective, these two points are indeed very close since consuming px 1 , x 2 q or consuming py 1 , y 2 q is indifferent. The large distance between bundle x and bundle y is driven purely by an assumption with no connections to the decision maker's economic problem. Second, consider a person with preferences over money. Presumably, for this person, more money is better, and a thousand dollars is very far from a million dollars. However, if a thousand dollars is the minimal expenditure required to hit the consumer's satiation point (for example, bundle p10, 10q in the first example), then any amount of money above a thousand dollars is not intrinsically far from the thousand dollars itself. Whether a million dollars and a thousand dollars are close or far should not depend on the whims of arithmetic but, rather, on what satisfaction a consumer can obtain from the additional money. 2 In short, this section states that all preferences are inherently continuous; some just happen to be discontinuous with respect to an exogenously given topology.
Informally, Proposition 4 shows that the space P cls is not Hausdorff, implying that imposing an exogenous topology on X (as we did in the previous section) is a necessary and sufficient condition for recovering the Hausdorff property on P cls . The proof relies on Lemma 9: every preference that is not totally indifferent is locally strict when X is endowed with the topology generated by the upper and lower contour sets. Thus, the same construction we used to show that U˚is not Hausdorff applies.
Proposition 2. Let P cls˚" tą: ą is locally strict when X has topology T X pąqu. Then, P cls˚i s not Hausdorff in the final topology.
This result shows that the trade-off between the Hausdorff property and pathconnectedness is unavoidable if the only topological assumption on X is that X is endowed with the topology T X pąq for each ą P P. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a fundamental trade-off between methodological generality, the intuitive properties of the topology on preferences, and the structure of indifference curves. While it is natural to dismiss the topological properties of P as a mere technicality, this paper shows that topological properties on the preference space have strong connections to relevant economic problems. Path-connectedness is relevant for comparative statics exercises, but it is incompatible with the Hausdorff property, which is a natural property for most economic applications. Furthermore, the Hausdorff property is incompatible with non-singleton indifference curves. Lemma 1. Let Z be any topological space. If g : P Ñ Z is continuous, then g is constant.
Proof. Let Z be any topological space and g : P Ñ Z be continuous. Let h :
U Ñ Z be defined by h " pg˝F q. Let ąP P be any preference, u P F´1pąq be such that }u} ă 1, and u n " 1 n u for each n P N. Such representations always exists because } arctanp¨q} ď 1 and arctan is strictly increasing. By the universal property of T , continuity of g implies continuity of h. Therefore, gp"q " hp0q " hplim nÑ8 tu n uq " hpuq " gpąq, where 0 is the constant function taking value 0. The third equality follows from F pu n q " F puq (so that hpu n q " hpuq for each n).
Since ą was arbitrarily selected this proves that g is constant.
The following proposition shows that, regardless of the topology imposed on U, P has the trivial topology. Key to this result is that "P P and tąu for each ąP P.
Theorem 5. Let T P denote the final topology on P. Then, T P " tH, Pu
Proof. Let S be the Sierpiński space and g : P Ñ S be continuous. By Lemma 1, g is constant. Thus, there exists exactly two continuous functions from P to S: the function that takes value 1 always, and the function that takes value 0 always. Hence, T P " tH, Pu. We now show that F is an open map; that is, F pGq is open whenever G is open. We provide two proofs of this result. The first proof is in Lemma 3 and does not rely on the topology of U˚, while the second one does. For Lemma 3 we use the following notation:˝denotes the operation of function composition, and SympU˚q is the symmetry group of U˚, that is, the set of permutations on
U˚endowed with the operation of function composition). The intuition behind the proof of Lemma 3 is that P˚is the quotient of U under the group action that associates each u P U˚with the set of utility functions that represent F puq. It is well known that the projection on the quotient via a continuous group action is an open map, so F is an open map. Proof. Let A be the set of increasing functions from R to R that are continuous in the standard topology of R. concretely, A " tf f : R Ñ Rf is continuous and strictly increasingu.
Then pA,˝q is a group that acts continuously on U˚in the following way: a : A Ñ SympU˚q is defined as apf qpuq " pf˝uq. Since each strictly increasing function has a strictly increasing inverse, then a is well defined. Also, for each f P A, 
Remark 2.
Because F is open then we can characterize the topology on P˚via it's basis elements. Indeed, if D is a basis for the topology on U˚then F pDq is a basis for the topology on P˚. When U˚is endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence (arguably, the most commonly used topology for applications), then this basis is easy to characterize explicitly. The next lemmas do that.
For the next lemma we use the following notation: if A Ă X and ąP P˚we use ą |A to denote the restriction of ą to A. Formally, ą |A "ą XpAˆAq. Proof. Let ą and A be as in the statement of the lemma. First, consider the case A " H. Then, for allą P P we obtainą|A " H "ą |A. Therefore Bpą, Aq " P˚, which is open. Next, consider A " txu Ă X. Then, x  x, a contradiction. Thus, without loss of generality, |A| ě 2. By Lemma 2, we need to show that F´1pBpą
, Aqq is open. Let u P F´1pBpą, Aqq. Let ε " mint|upxq´upyq| : x, y P Au ą 0. This is well defined since A is finite. Then, Bpu, ε 2 q Ă F´1pBpą, Aqq, where Bpu, ε 2 q is the ball of center u and radius ε 2 . Thus, F´1pBpą, Aqq is open.
For the following Lemma, let D be basis of intervals for T U˚. That is, D P D if, and only if, the following holds: there exists a finite set of elements x 1 , ..., x N P X and a finite set of intervals I 1 , ..., I N Ă R such that for all u P D˚, upx n q P I n for each n P t1, ..., Nu.
Proof. Let D be as in the statement of the Lemma, and tx 1 , ..., x N u, tI 1 , ...I N u
be the corresponding points in X and intervals in R. The proof is divided in two cases.
Case 1: Assume that X N n"1 I n " H. Then, there is a subset T Ă t1, ..., Nu such that I n X I k " H for all n, k P T . Indeed, let I n " pa n , b n q for each n. Let a " maxta n : 1 ď n ď Nu, and b " mintb n : 1 ď n ď Nu. Then,ā ě b, else each z P pā, bq satisfies z P XI n , a contradiction. Thus, at least two intervals are disjoint. Let A " tx t : t P T u. Then, for all u, v P D and all x, x 1 P A, upxq ą upx 1 q ô vpxq ą vpx 1 q. Without loss of generality enumerate the set A " tx t : t P T u in a monotone increasing way. That is, for all u P D, if k ą n then upx k q ą upx n q. Then, F pDq " tąP P : p@ k, n P T q k ą n ñ x k ą x n u.
Thus, Lemma 4 implies F pDq is open.
Case 2: Assume that X n " 1 N I n ‰ H. Then, F pDq " P˚. Indeed, let ąP På nd u P U be a representation of ą. Let I " X n " 1 N I n . Then, without loss of generality upxq P I for each x P X. Thus, u P D. Hence, ą" F puq P F pDq. To conclude, because P P T P and F pDq " P then F pDq P T P . For the next Lemma, we use the following notation: Bpą, Aq " tą :ą | A "ą | Au, where A Ă X is a finite set, and ąP P such that, for all x, y P A, x ‰ y. Theorem 6. Let B " tBpą, Aq :ąP P˚, A is finiteu. Then, B is a basis for T P˚.
Proof. By Lemmas 3 and 6, the image of D via F is a basis for T P˚. Since For the next lemma, we use the following notation. Let u P U and x P X; we use u´x to denote the restriction of u to Xztxu. That is, u´x : Xztxu Ñ X. Similarly, if r P R, then pr, u´xq denote the function v : X Ñ R defined by vpxq " r and vpyq " upyq for y ‰ x. Lastly, if r P R, we use boldface to denote the constant funtion r: rpxq " r for each x P X. This is the analogous notation one uses for finitely dimensional vectors, and is convenient for out purposes.
Lemma 7. Assume X has at least three elements. Then, U˚is path connected.
Proof. Let u, v P U˚. Pick x, y P X such that the following hold:
1.upxq ‰ upyq, 2.-pDc P Xq such that vpxq ‰ vpcq, and c ‰ y Such x, y exist because #X ě 3. We will continuously transform u into v, showing that U˚is not only connected, but path-connected. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1: For each s P r0, 1s define t as follows
z " x p1´squpzq`svpzq z ‰ x, y upyq z " y G x " tpu x , u y q P R : u x ą u y u and G y " tpu x , u y q P R : u y ą u x u. Then, G x and G y disconnect U˚.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3 and Proposition 1 Theorem 7. Let B " tBpą, Aq :ąP P s , A is finiteu. Then, B is a basis for T P s .
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 applies verbatim, since that proof never used that preferences where not strict. Indeed, the proof of Theorem 2 relies on » being excluded from P, which is still true in this case.
Lemma 8. P s is totally path disconnected.
Proof. It suffices to show that U s is totally path disconnected. Take u, v P U s be distinct functions. Assume there is a path t joining u and v. That is, t :
S Ñ U s with tp0q " u, tp1q " v and t continuous. Since u ‰ v there are points x, y P X such that upxq ą upyq and vpyq ą vpxq. Let ∆psq " tpsqpxq´tpsqpyq.
Then, ∆p0q ą 0 ą ∆p1q. Thus, there is a point s˚such that ∆ps˚q " 0. Then, tps˚qpxq " tps˚qpyq, contradicting that tps˚q P U s . Thus, no two distinct functions are path-connected.
Proposition 3. Assume P s ‰ H. Let P 0 be Hausdorff and P s Ă P 0 . Then, P 0 " P s .
Proof. Assume not. Then, P 0 is Hausdorff and there exists ąP P 0 zP s . Let x, y P X such that x " y. Such points must exists because ąR P s and assume that this is the only instance of indifference. This assumption is without loss of generality. 3 Furthermore, let A " tz : x " z " y z ‰ x, z ‰ yu. If A ‰ H, let v : A Ñ r0, 1s be a strict ranking of the points in A. That is, p@a, b P Aq, vpaq ‰ vpbq. Let u represent ą. For each n P N, define the following utility functions:
upzq´2 n x ą z or z " x upzq`2 n z ą y or z " y upxq`vpzq z P A Notice the following: u n P P s Ă P 0 for all n, u n Ñ u, F pu 1 q " F pu n q for all n P N, and F pą 1 q ‰ą. Thus, ąP tF pu 1 qu, thus violating that P 0 is Hausdorff.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 8. The space P cls is Hausdorff.
Proof. Assume ą is locally constant and continuous. Assume, by way of contradiction, thatą P tąu,ą ‰ą. Then,ą " lim nÑ8 ą n , where ą 1 "ą 2 " ... "ą. By Theorem 2, this means that if yąx then y ą x. Thus,ą ‰ą mens that there exits a pair px, yq P XˆX such that x ą y and x"y. Because ą is continuous this means there are neighborhoods V x of x and V y of y such that x 1 ą y 1 for all x 1 P V x and y 1 P V y . Furthermore, becauseą is locally strict and xÁy, then there exists x 2 P V x and y 2 inV y such that y 2 ą x 2 . Because ą n Ñą, y 2ą x 2 implies y 2 ą x 2 . However, this contradicts that x 1 ą y 1 for all x 1 P V x and y 1 P V y .
Lemma 9. Let ąP P˚. Then, ą˚is locally strict in pX, T X pą˚qq.
Proof. Let px, yq P X be such that x Á y. If x ą y then the locally strict property hold vacuously. Assume then that x " y. Then, there wither exists z such that z ą x or there exists z 1 such that y ą z 1 , or both. Otherwise, for each z the following holds: x Á z Á y " x, implying that ąR P˚, a contradiction. Then, let V be a neighborhood of px, yq. Then, there is a basis element A P T X pąq and a basis element B P T X pąq such that px, yq P AˆB Ă V . By definition of basis elements, there exists z P A and z 1 P B such that z ą x and y ą z 1 . Thus, pz, z 1 q P V and z ą z 1 , proving that ą is locally strict.
Proposition 4. Let P cls˚" tą: ą is locally strict when X has topology T X pąqu. Then, P cls˚i s not Hausdorff in the final topology.
